NONPROLIFERATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME

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International regimes are created to increase predictability of the international system by creating specific rules that states can/should follow

This is about **cooperation** in broad sense of the word

Definition of international regimes:

"...principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area."

(Stephen Krasner, 1982)

Key features:

- Set of rules (code of conduct): legally binding, informal, tacit, etc.
- Voluntary limitation of sovereign freedom of action: participants follow the code even if it contradicts immediate interests
- Reciprocity: all members abide by the regime
- Comprehensiveness: all or majority of relevant actors participate

CONDITIONS OF COOPERATION:

«Prisoner's Dilemma»

Player A

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	3, 3	1, 4
Defect	4, 1	2, 2

Player B

Distribution of Preferences:

- 1. Defect, other cooperates 4 points
- 2. Both cooperate 3 points
- 3. Both defect 2 points
- 4. Cooperate, other defects 1 points


OUTCOME: in an attempt to minimize losses both defect

SHADOW OF THE FUTURE:

Multiple Interactions Changes the Order of Preferences

- 1. Both cooperate 3N points
- 2. Defect, other cooperates -4+2(N-1) points
- 3. Both defect 2N points
- 4. Cooperate, other defects -1+2(N-1) points

- With multiple rounds losses from defection of the other in the first round are negligible – can risk cooperation
- With multiple rounds gain from defection in the first round is negligible compared to subsequent loss from absence of cooperation



Both sides have a reason to risk cooperation in first round and continue cooperation as long as it is mutual

Conditions for Emergence of Regime:

- Benefits from cooperation exceed benefits from defection under at least some scenarios
- Multiple interactions over time (shadow of the future)
- Transparency of interests, intentions, and distribution of preferences

Two kinds of transparency:

- -- "I" know intentions and preferences of the other side
- -- The other side knows "my" intentions and preferences

Important not only to obtain, but also provide information

EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION:

Problem of Collective Action (Problem of Commons):

Joint use of a single resource

Indivisible

Finite

EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION:

Two options:

Equal Participants

Hegemonic

Distribution of Preferences Under Hegemonic Regimes

Weak Player

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	10, 3	8, 5
Defect	12, 0	3, 1

Hegemon

Distribution of Preferences

	Hegemon	Weak Player
Both Cooperate	10N	3N
Defect on the Other	12+3(N-1)	5+(N-1)
Other Defects	8+3(N-1)	N-1
Both Defect	3N	N
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Threshold of Stability for Hegemonic Regime

Weak Player

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	11, 1	8 , 5
Defect	12, 0	3, 1

Hegemon

Threshold is defined by indifference to presence or absence of cooperation (same gains/losses)

Options for Hegemon:

Increase Benefits for Weak Players

Force Into Cooperation

TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

- International organization
- treaty (often includes an organization)
- Informal regime:
 - -- negotiated (executive agreement, joint statement)
 - -- informal (parallel declarations i.e., moratoriums on nuclear testing)
- Tacit (presumed, not codified on paper)

Functions of international organizations:

- Transparency (forum + rules + categories/volume of data)
- Resolution of conflicts, concerns, questions

 Rule-making (amendments to existing regime or creation of new regime)

Features of the NPT:

- Hegemonic: created under leadership of two superpowers
- Based on consensus of majority of states
- Highly developed:
 - -- treaty-based (legally binding)
 - -- includes an international organization (IAEA) as well as associated organizations (NSG, others)
 - -- linked to other regimes, including export control, MPC&A, disarmament, nuclear weapons free zones, etc.